Abstract. This paper examines the completion of an ω-ordered sequence of recursive definition which on the one hand defines an increasing sequence of nested set and on the other redefines successively a numeric variable as the cardinal of the successively defined nested sets. The consequence is a contradiction involving the consistency of ω-order and then that of the Axiom of Infinity.
Recursion and successiveness
A recursive definition usually starts with a first definition (basic clause) which is followed by an infinite (usually ω-ordered) sequence of definitions such that each one of them defines an object in terms of the previously defined ones (inductive or recursive clause). For instance, if A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . } is an ω-ordered set, the following recursive definition:
A i+1 = A i ∪ {a i+1 }; i = 1, 2, 3, . . . recursive clause (2) defines an ω-ordered increasing sequence A i i∈N of nested sets A 1 ⊂ A 2 ⊂ A 3 ⊂ . . . Recursive definitions as (1)- (2) imply (mathematical) successiveness: the definition of each term (except the first one) must be preceded by the definition of its immediate predecessor. According to the actual infinity we assume the completion of all successive definitions of an ω-recursive definition in the same sense we assume the existence of the set N of natural numbers as a complete infinite totality (Axiom of Infinity). Consequently, the sequence A i i∈N resulting from ( (1)- (2) is also a complete infinite totality, as complete and infinite as the set N of natural numbers. As we will see in the short discussion that follows there is an elementary way of testing the assumed completion of ω-recursive definitions by means of a numeric variable which is successively redefined as the cardinal of the successive terms of the sequence. In this way, the control variable forces the recursive clause to leave a permanent trace of its assumed actual completion.
Testing an ω-recursive definition
Consider again the above ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions (1)-(2), whose recursive clause will be slightly modified according to:
where x is a numerical variable whose successive redefinitions are intended to examine the consequences of assuming the completion of the uncompletable 1 ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions (3)-(4). Let A i i∈N be the sequence of nested sets defined by recursive definition (3)-(4), a definition that from now on will be referred to as D i i∈N , being D i the i-th definition of (3)- (4) . According to the hypothesis of the actual infinity it is usually assumed that A i i∈N is defined as a complete infinite totality, which implies the completion of the ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions D i i∈N . To complete the ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions D i i∈N means that each one of its countably many definitions D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , . . . , have been carried out. Some infinitists claim, however, that the completion of the ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions D i i∈N , as such completion, is a subsequent additional definition different from all D i . But, evidently, this would not be an ω-ordered sequence but an (ω +1)-ordered one. In addition, and taking into account that its last (ω +1)-th definition has not an immediate predecessor, the recursive clause (4) could not be applied to it. We would have to explicitly declare what this (ω +1)-th definition is. Or assume that variables and sets can autonomously define themselves. Consequently, in what follows we will assume the completion of the ω-ordered sequence of recursive definitions D i i∈N means to perform each one of the countable many definitions D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , . . . , and only them. In these conditions, the control variable x makes it possible to prove the following propositions:
Proof. It is evident that all successive sets A i defined by (3)-(4) are finite: for all i in N, the set A i is exactly defined as {a 2 , a 2 , . . . , a i }, which has exactly a finite number i of elements. Consequently each definition D i of D i i∈N defines x as a precise finite cardinal.
Proposition 2. The ω-ordered sequence of definitions D i i∈N does not define x as a finite cardinal.
Proof. Let n be any finite cardinal. It is quite clare that D i i∈N does not define x as n because if that were the case x would not have been defined as A i for all i > n. Thus no finite cardinal n exists such that x results defined as n. Note this is not a question of indeterminacy but of impossibility.
Proposition 3. The ω-ordered sequence of definitions D i i∈N defines x as a finite cardinal.
Proof. Assume the ω-ordered sequence of definitions D i i∈N defines x not as a finite cardinal. This means that x may result undefined by D i i∈N or defined but not as a finite cardinal. This hypothesis is only possible if one of the following two alternatives holds:
(1) There exists a natural number n such that any D i, i≥n may define
x not as a finite cardinal. (2) There is an additional definition following all D i which defines
x not as a finite cardinal.
In fact, if any D i, i≥n may define x not as a finite cardinal number, then we cannot ensure D i i∈N defines x as a finite cardinal number and then the above initial hypothesis is possible. But according to Proposition 1 all D i defines x as a precise finite cardinal number, just as the finite cardinal i. In consequence alternative 1 is impossible. According to the second alternative we would have an (ω + 1)-ordered sequence of definitions, while D i i∈N is only ω-ordered. The second alternative is also impossible. Consequently, the initial hypothesis is false. It is therefore impossible the ω-ordered sequence of definitions D i i∈N defines x not as a finite cardinal. Consequently it must define it as a finite cardinal.
Some recalcitrant infinitists claim that x results undefined by D i i∈N , although not as a consequence of a particular definition D i but as a consequence of having completed that ω-ordered sequence of definitions. This evidently implies that the completion of the ω-ordered sequence of definitions D i i∈N , as such completion, has its own consequences on the value of x; i.e that the completion of D i i∈N , as such completion, is a sort of bad or undeterminable definition from which x results undefined. But, I insist, this would be an ω +1 ordered sequence of definitions, while we have just proved it is an ω-ordered one which defines and not defines x as a finite cardinal.
Consequences on the Axiom of Infinity
After a long history of more than twenty six centuries, the existence of actual infinities continues to be an assumption. As is well known, in the second half of XIX century B. Bolzano [2] and R. Dedekind [11] tried unsuccessfully to prove the existence of actual infinite totalities (both proofs were compatible with the potential infinity). The founder of modern transfinite mathematics G. Cantor simply took it for granted the existence of denumerable infinite totalities 2 , as we can read in his Beiträge [4, page 492], [7, pages 103-104]. In accordance with his profound theological platonism [10] Cantor was firmly convinced of the actual existence of complete infinite totalities [4] , [5] , [3] , [8] , [9] . But mere convictions do not suffice in mathematics and we finally had to establish the existence of those denumerable actual infinite totalities by the expeditious way of axioms (Axiom of Infinity).
An immediate consequence of the Axiom of Infinity is the ω-ordering [7] , which, among other extravagances, legitimates the completion of ω-recursive definitions in which no last definition actually completes the sequence of definitions. For this and many other similar reasons, it is remarkable the lack of interest in contemporary philosophy of mathematics to analyze the formal consistency of the hypothesis of the actual infinity [12] , which, in addition, is anything but selfevident. The above elementary discussion motivated by control variable x shows, on the other hand, the vulnerability of the actual infinity when it is forced to leave a trace of its actual existence. The above contradiction between Propositions 3 and 2 derives from the suspicious ω-order attribute of being complete (as the actual infinity requires) and uncompletable (because no last element completes it). As Aristotle would surely say, that contradiction is an inevitable consequences of assuming that it is possible to traverse the untraversable [1] .
Let us finally examine the case of potentially infinite recursive definitions. From the perspective of the potential infinity only finite complete totalities can be considered, although they can be as large as we wish. Let therefore n be any natural number, A i 1≤i≤n the finite sequence of nested sets formed by the first n sets of A i i∈N , and D i 1≤i≤n the finite recursive definition formed by the first n recursive definitions of D i i∈N . In this case we will always have:
because there is a last term A n in A i 1≤i≤n and a last definition D n in D i 1≤i≤n that defines x as n, and then Proposition 2, no longer holds. We can therefore state that for any n in N, recursive definition D i 1≤i≤n is consistent. Only D ω is inconsistent. And being ω -order the only difference between D ω and D n, ∀n∈N it is quite clair, therefore, that ω -order is the only cause of that inconsistency.
2 He also tried to give a proof on the existence of actual infinite totalities (quoted in [13] , p. 3, from [6] , p. 404):
... in truth the potential infinite has only a borrowed reality, insofar as potentially infinite concept always points towards a logically prior actually infinite concept whose existence it depends on. which evidently is anything but a formal proof.
